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Abstract
We consider a model where the central bank faces a credibility
problem in its announcements, but also cares about its credibility and,
therefore, wants to make truthful announcements. We show that, al-
though the central bank would be able to perfectly transmit its infor-
mation to the private sector through precise announcements, the cen-
tral bank may nonetheless prefer to make imprecise announcements.
This choice of the central bank would be suboptimal from the point of
view of society. However, if the central bank gives enough weight to
making truthful announcements, this suboptimality disappears, be-
cause the central bank would then prefer precise announcements to
imprecise announcements.
JEL classification: E58, E52
Keywords: central bank transparency, central bank announcements,
imprecise announcements, credibility.
1 Introduction
The basic economic reason in favor of central bank (CB) transparency is that
more transparency allows the private sector (PS) to have more information.
Amore informed PS should make better decisions, which should be beneficial.
Of course, things may be more complicated. The theoretical literature on
CB transparency has exhibited diﬀerent situations where such an argument
may not hold and where, as a consequence, transparency may be harmful
∗Paris School of Economics (PSE-UMR8545), CNRS and CEPREMAP. Address:
CEPREMAP, 142 rue du Chevaleret, 75013 Paris, France. Ph: 33 (0)1 40 77 84 08.
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rather than beneficial. Thus, according to this literature, the results could
depend on the model considered and on the specific assumptions made1.
Nonetheless, consider a situation where the basic argument in favor of
CB transparency holds: it is beneficial to have a more informed PS because
the PS can make more eﬃcient decisions. There still remains the problem of
how the CB can transmit its information to the PS in a credible way. Cred-
ibility of monetary policy is an issue which has received a lot of attention
in the literature. This literature has underlined that the CB may have an
incentive to manipulate the PS’s expectations and that, consequently, its an-
nouncements about future monetary policy may not be credible. This leads
to some ineﬃciency when the CB cannot commit to its future monetary pol-
icy2. But the same credibility problem may also prevent the CB to transmit
its information to the PS.
Thus, suppose the CB has some private information on some variable, and
that it would be useful to transmit this information to the PS. This variable
could concern the objectives of the CB or an underlying shock. Suppose the
CB tries to transmit its private information to the PS by telling the PS what
its information on this underlying variable is, or, more indirectly, by making
an announcement on a variable which depends on this underlying variable,
like telling to the PS what its future monetary policy will be. Then, the
credibility problem which aﬀects the CB could make these announcements
not credible. As a consequence, it is possible that no information to the PS
could be transmitted in such a way.
Two remedies to this issue of transmitting the information to the PS could
be considered. The first consists in having some signalling cost of making
announcements. If the cost is large enough, it may become possible for the
CB to transmit its private information through such announcements3. The
second remedy is to have imprecise announcements. For, even if there are
no signalling costs and, therefore, even if announcements are "cheap talk",
some information to the PS could still be transmitted through imprecise
announcements4.
It is likely that both aspects should play a role in the real world. First,
1For some recent survey of the theoretical and empirical literature, see, for example,
Blinder et al. (2008) and van der Cruijsen and Eijﬃnger (2007).
2Standard references on these issues are Barro and Gordon (1983) and Kydland and
Prescott (1977).
3Models of signalling have been applied to monetary policy. For models where, through
the signalling of the CB, the PS learns the CB’s type, see, for example, Palmqvist (1999)
and Vickers (1986).
4See the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Stein (1989) has applied this
kind of analysis to monetary policy when the CB has some private information on the
exchange rate target.
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the CB usually cares about its credibility and therefore is trying to make
announcements which will appear to be true ex post5. Second, the CB does
not always make precise quantitative announcements. A part of the CB’s
announcements consists in some rather qualitative imprecise statements6.
The aim of the present paper is to develop an analysis which simual-
tenously and explicitly considers these two aspects, and examine how they
interact. If there are signalling costs due to the credibility concern of the CB,
it may be possible to make credible precise announcements. Then, does this
mean that the CB will choose to make these precise announcements? The
CB may actually prefer to make imprecise announcements. But to examine
this point, we must consider how imprecise announcements can be equilibria
when there are some signalling costs. This mean that the analysis, which
exhibits these imprecise announcements as the only possible equilibria in the
cheap talk case, has to be reconsidered in the presence of such costs. These
are the issues that we will consider.
In order to simplify the analysis, to be able to solve the model analyti-
cally, and to easily relate this analysis to the previous studies found in the
literature, we consider a simple static model of credibility of monetary policy.
The CB has some useful private information on some underlying variable af-
fecting monetary policy, and makes some announcement about this variable.
As the CB is concerned by its credibility, it is assumed that the CB bears
some cost when it does not transmit its information in a truthful way. The
model is presented in Section 2.
As indicated above, we consider equilibria with precise announcements,
and also equilibria with imprecise announcements. These are considered in
Section 3. In Section 4, we examine the issue of the choice of the CB be-
tween these equilibria. In particular, we want to know whether, and under
what conditions, the CB prefers imprecise rather than precise announce-
ments. This is important because, as we will see, from the point of view
of society, imprecise announcements are less eﬃcient than precise announce-
ments. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
5Thus, Blinder (2000) has sent a questionnaire on issues related to CB credibility to the
heads of all CBs which are menbers of the BIS. The answers (84 central bankers responded)
indicate that "living up to its word" is ranked first in importance.
6For example, the Fed has made rather imprecise qualitative statements on its future
policy (see Rudebusch and Williams (2006)).
3
2 Model
We consider a very standard and simple static model of monetary policy,
where a credibility issue arise because the CB has a desired level of employ-
ment which is greater than the level of employment desired by the private
sector7.
The private sector (PS) is made of a large number of identical sectors
and, in each sector, the wage setters want to stabilize employment according
to the utility function
UPS = −n2 (1)
As all sectors are identical, the variable n can be taken to represent ag-
gregate employment. In (1) , the desired level of employment of the PS has
been normalized to zero. Once the nominal wage has been fixed, employment
is determined by labor demand according to
n = −α (w − π) + η (2)
where w represents the (log of the) nominal wage (which, as all sectors are
alike, is the same in all sectors), π is the inflation rate, and w − π is the
(log of the) real wage (because the last period (log of the) price level p−1
has been normalized to zero). Equation (2) indicates that employment is a
decreasing function of the real wage. The variable η is a zero-mean random
variable which represents a shock which aﬀects employment (a productivity
shock). We assume that the CB has some private information about η and,
for simplicity, the CB will be assumed to know η8.
The timing of the decisions of the CB and of the PS is as follows. At
the beginning of the period, the CB makes some announcement about the
shock η. After having heard the CB’s announcement, the PS determines the
nominal wage variable w, and, subsequently, the CB determines the inflation
rate π. The CB has the utility function
UCB = −(n− µ)2 − ψ(π − π)2 − ξ (ηan − η)2 (3)
7The model is taken from Rogoﬀ (1985) and is in the line of the models of credibility
of monetary policy of Barro and Gordon (1983) and Kydland and Prescott (1977).
8We have chosen to present the analysis by considering that the variable on which the
CB has private information is the shock η (Therefore, in terms of signalling theory, the
"type" of the CB is given by the value of η). However, we could as well have taken some
other variable which aﬀect monetary policy. For example, we could have assumed that the
variable on which the CB has private information is the CB’s inflation target π (see (3)
just below), as in the signalling model of Palmqvist (1999). Then, the CB’s "type" would
be given by the value of π. It could easily be seen that, in this case, we would end up with
exactly the same formal analysis and results as those we obtain here with the variable η.
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The CB wants to stabilize the level of employment n around a desired
level µ > 0, which is therefore greater than the level of employment desired
by the PS9. The CB also wants to stabilize inflation around some desired
level π.
The variable ηan is the "announced value" of η. It is assumed that the
PS can observe η ex post, and the term ξ (ηan − η)2 in (3) represents the
cost incurred by the CB, due to a loss of credibility, when the CB makes
its announcement. This cost is equal to zero when the CB transmits its
information in a truthful way, by simply announcing the true value η. But,
in general, when the CB makes some other announcements, the CB will bear
some credibility cost, because the lack of truthfulness in the announcement
will impair the credibility of the CB10.
In the case of precise announcements, where the CB announces a value
of η, then ηan is simply this announced value. In the case of imprecise
announcements, where the CB announces that η belongs to some interval, it
will be assumed, for simplicity, that ηan is the mean of this interval. This
announced value ηan would correspond to the value of η expected by the PS
if the PS did not take into account any other information than what the CB
says. Note that even if η did in fact belong to the announced interval, the
CB, in general, would still be penalized, because, by being imprecise, the CB
would not be telling the whole truth. Thus, if we have ηan 6= η, the PS would
be mislead by such an announcement, because the imprecise announcement
would tend to give wrong expectations to the PS, which is penalized.
Let ze the expectation that the PS has on any variable z after the CB’s
announcement. Being small, each wage setter takes expected inflation πe as
given. Maximizing the expected utility EUPS under the constraint (2) gives
the nominal wage
w = πe +
ηe
α
(4)
9A usual arguments involve the presence of distortions due to taxes.
10Our model takes as exogenous this cost due to a loss of credibility, and does not try to
explain why the CB would care to loose credibility by making untruthful announcements.
This cost takes into account the fact that, in the real world, CBs do care about their
credibility and about making truthful announcements.
Some quadratic cost of deviating from an announced policy because the CB cares about
its credibility, is introduced in Gerbasch and Hahn (2008), who use this cost function to
study the trade-oﬀ between gains from commitment and losses of flexibility implied by
forward guidance.
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From (2) and (4) , we get11
n = α (π − πe) + η − ηe (5)
Then, the CB chooses π which maximize UCB. From (3) and (5) , the
first order condition is
α (n− µ) + ψ (π − π) = 0 (6)
which, using (5) , can be written
π =
1
α2 + ψ
£
α2πe + ψπ + αµ− α (η − ηe)
¤
(7)
Taking the expected value of each member of (7) and substracting to (7)
gives
π − πe = − α
α2 + ψ
(η − ηe) (8)
From (5) and (8) we get
n =
ψ
α2 + ψ
(η − ηe) (9)
From (1), (3) , (6) and (9) we get
UCB = −α
2 + ψ
ψ
∙
ψ
α2 + ψ
(η − ηe)− µ
¸2
− ξ (ηan − η)2 (10)
UPS = −
µ
ψ
α2 + ψ
¶2
(η − ηe)2 (11)
The rest of the paper will be devoted to the issue of the announcement
strategy of the CB.
3 Equilibria
We will first examine whether there exists an equilibrium where the CB
announces a precise value of η. Then, we will also look for equilibria where
the CB makes some imprecise announcements.
11In the literature on CB transparency, the analysis has often relied on an expectations-
augmented Phillips curve model, given by the equation n = α (π − πe) + ε, where the
shock ε is exogenously given. However, as we see here, the shock ε should depend on
transparency, because, according to (5) , ε is equal to η−ηe, and therefore depends on the
expectations of the private sector (more generally, on this point, see Laskar (2010)).
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3.1 Precise announcements
We consider the case where the CB announces some precise value ηan. This
announced value is a function of the true value η. From (10) , we see that
the CB has an incentive to manipulate the expectation ηe of the PS. The CB
would like ηe to be equal to η−α2+ψψ µ, and therefore to be smaller than η by an
amount proportional to the gap µ between the desired levels of employment
of the CB and of the PS. The reason is that, according to (4) , a lower value
of ηe decreases the nominal wage w. This tends to increase employment and
therefore to make employment closer to the CB’s employment target. This
means that the CB would like the PS to believe that the employment shock
η is smaller than what it is in reality.
Thus, it seems natural to look for an equilibrium where the CB’s strategy
is ηan = η−θ, where θ > 0 is some given "bias" in the CB’s announcement12.
At the equilibrium, the PS takes the strategy of the CB as given and forms
its expectations accordingly. This implies
ηe = ηan + θ (12)
At the equilibrium, the CB knows that the expectation ηe of the PS is
given by (12) . From (10) and (12) , we get
UCB = −α
2 + ψ
ψ
∙
ψ
α2 + ψ
(η − ηan − θ)− µ
¸2
− ξ (ηan − η)2 (13)
The equilibrium condition is that the strategy ηan = η − θ is an optimal
strategy when the CB maximizes UCB given by (13) . From (13) , the first
order condition dU
CB
dηan = 0 for maximizing U
CB yields ηan = η − ψθ+(α
2+ψ)µ
ψ+(α2+ψ)ξ .
Consequently, the strategy ηan = η − θ is an equilibrium if and only if we
have
ψθ+(α2+ψ)µ
ψ+(α2+ψ)ξ = θ, which is equivalent to θξ = µ. Therefore, we get:
Proposition 1 In the cheap talk case ξ = 0, there is no equilibrium with
precise announcements.
In the case ξ > 0, there is an equilibrium with precise announcements. It
is given by ηan = η − eθ, where the equilibrium announcement bias eθ is given
by eθ = µ
ξ
(14)
12In fact, this particular form does not restrict the generality of the analysis. For,
because of the linear quadratic structure of the model, we would only have to consider the
linear CB’s announcement strategy ηan = θ0+ θ1η, where θ0 and θ1 are coeﬃcients. But,
then, it can easily be shown that such a strategy can be an equilibrium only if we have
θ1 = 1. Therefore, no other equilibrium strategies would be found by using this extended
set of strategies.
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The result can be interpreted in the following way. If the CB announced
a value of ηan marginally smaller than η −θ, the CB would have the marginal
benefit of more favorable expectations of the PS, but it would also have to
bear the marginal cost due to the corresponding greater loss of credibility.
The marginal benefit is obtained by diﬀerentiating the first term of the right
hand side of (13) . Using the equality ηan = η − θ, this gives a marginal
benefit equal to 2µ. The marginal cost is obtained by diﬀerentiating the
second term of (13) , which (using ηan = η − θ) gives a marginal cost equal
to 2ξθ. An equilibrium is obtained when the marginal cost is equal to the
marginal benefit.
3.2 Imprecise announcements
Precise announcements exist in the case ξ > 0 but may not be the unique
equilibrium. As the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (1982) suggests, there
may also exist equilibria with imprecise announcements. Crawford and Sobel
(1982) only considered the cheap talk case ξ = 0, but some similar analysis
and results may also hold in the case ξ > 0. Therefore, we will also look for
equilibria with imprecise announcements in the context of our model.
As in the illustrative example of Crawford and Sobel (1982), we will
make a uniform distribution assumption in order to simplify the analysis.
We will assume that η is uniformly distributed on [ηm, ηM ]
13. Then, consider
a partition (a0, a1, ..., aN−1, aN) of [ηm, ηM ], where we have a0 = ηm < a1 <
... < aN−1 < aN = ηM . In the same way as for the equilibrium with perfect
precision, the CB’s announcement strategy may have some bias. Consider a
given bias θ > 0. Then, the strategy of the CB consists in announcing that
η belongs to the interval [ai−1 − θ, ai − θ] whenever η belongs to the interval
]ai−1, ai] , for i = 1, ..., N 14.
13As a uniform distribution has a finite support, such an assumption, however, leads
to the undesirable property that the CB may announce values outside the support. For,
as the equilibrium with perfect precision has underlined, the CB’s announcements may
exhibit some bias θ which leads the CB to announce a value which is lower than the true
value. This implies that the announced value would be ouside the support when η is
close enough (i.e. by an amount smaller than θ) to the lower limit ηm of this support.
Therefore, we may rather view the uniform distribution assumption as a limit case. We
could assume that the support of η is infinite but that the distribution is very close to a
uniform distribution. Formally, we could assume that, inside the interval [ηm, ηM ] , the
density is constant, and that the probability that η does not belong to this interval is equal
to ε. Then, we could consider the uniform distribution as a limit case case when ε goes to
zero.
14It would remain to specify the strategy when η is equal to ηm = a0.We could assume,
for example, that, in this case, the CB announces that η belongs to [a0, a1] . (However,
8
As the PS knows the CB’s strategy, it takes into acount this bias θ when it
determines its expectations, and therefore the PS knows the true interval to
which η belongs. Therefore, because of the uniform distribution assumption
on [ηm, ηM ], when η belongs to ]ai−1, ai] we have
ηe =
ai−1 + ai
2
(15)
On the other hand, we have previously assumed that the "announced
value" ηan, which enters the loss function (10), is equal to the mean of the
announced interval. As this announced interval is [ai−1 − θ, ai − θ] , this gives
ηan =
ai−1 + ai
2
− θ (16)
From (15) and (16) , we see that (12) and therefore also (13) are still valid
in the case of imprecise announcements.
For each given value of the bias parameter θ > 0, we will look for partition
equilibria (a0, a1, ..., aN−1, aN). Note that we can limit the analysis to the
case θ < eθ because any partition equilibrium associated to a bias θ ≥ eθ,
if it existed, would be more imprecise than the equilibrium with precise
announcements without having a smaller bias. It would therefore never be
chosen by the CB15.
We obtain the following result (see Appendix 1 for the proof):
Proposition 2 To each value of the announcement bias θ such that 0 ≤
θ < eθ, we can associate an equilibrium partition16 (a∗0, a∗1, ..., a∗N∗−1, a∗N∗).
The number N∗ of intervals of the equilibrium partition is
N∗ =
*
−1
2
+
1
2
µ
1 +
2
B
¶1
2
+
(17)
where hxi denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to x, and where
B is given by
B =
1
ηM − ηm
α2 + ψ
(α2 + ψ) ξ + ψ
(µ− ξθ) > 0 (18)
other assumptions, like announcing the value ηm, would lead to the same results, because
the probability that η is equal to ηm is equal to zero.)
15From (20) below, it will be clear that both the imprecision and the bias of the an-
nouncement decrease the expected utility of the CB.
16As in Crawford and Sobel (1982), there is actually a finite number of equilibria ob-
tained for all values of N such that N ≤ N∗. However, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982),
all equilibria corresponding to N < N∗ are dominated by the equilibrium obtained for
N = N∗ (i.e. they are worse for both players). They will therefore be disgarded for the
static comparative analysis that we will do.
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Let σ2η be the residual variance of η that the PS expects to have after
having heard the CB’s announcement. We have
σ2η =
1
3
∙
1
4N∗2
+B2(N∗2 − 1)
¸
(ηM − ηm)2 (19)
When we have ξ > 0, the residual variance σ2η is a decreasing function of
the bias θ : the greater the bias, the smaller the imprecision of the announce-
ment. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between the imprecision and the bias of the
announcement. The imprecision goes to zero when θ goes to eθ.
The residual variance σ2η is a decreasing function of the weight ξ
17.
Proposition 2 exhibit similarities with the results obtained in the cheap
talk analysis of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In fact, it can be shown that, in
the cheap talk case ξ = 0, through some adequate change of variables, the
present model can be put under the form of the illustrative model of Crawford
and Sobel (1982) (see Appendix 1). Furthermore, in the case ξ > 0, the
analysis leads to the same kind of solutions as in the case ξ = 0, provided that
some parameter of the model is modified. The change concerns parameter
B, which, according to (18) , depends on θ and ξ.
Thus, this result generalizes the result of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to
the case ξ > 0. As (18) indicates, in the cheap talk case ξ = 0, the equilibrium
is the same whatever the bias θ is18, but, in the case ξ > 0, parameter B,
and therefore the equilibrium, depend on the bias θ.
As indicated in Proposition 2, the imprecision, given by σ2η, is smaller
when the bias θ increases. In order to interpret this result, first note that, in
the cheap talk case ξ = 0, imprecise announcements can be an equilibrium
because it may not be advantageous for the CB to announce a lower interval
and have the private sector have the implied lower expected value for η.
For, from (10) , it is beneficial for the CB to have ηe lower than η by some
amount, but this can be overdone. If ηe is too low, this could be worse.
Such a case will occur when, broadly speaking, intervals are large enough.
Second, when we have ξ > 0, there is an additional cost to announce the
lower interval. Consequently, a partition with intervals of smaller lengths
could become an equilibrium because of this additional cost when we have
ξ > 0. The greater θ is, the greater this cost is (because the corresponding
marginal cost is equal to 2ξθ, as we have previously seeen), and, therefore,
17Note that, as the inequality θ < eθ = µξ has to be satisfied, then , for a given θ, the
weight ξ has to satisfy the inequality ξ < µθ .
18Therefore, in the cheap talk case, it is not useful to introduce such a bias in the
analysis.
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the smaller the lengths of intervals can be. This implies a smaller imprecision
of the announcements when θ increases. This means that there is a trade-oﬀ
between the imprecision and the bias of the announcement.
As the imprecision goes to zero when θ goes to eθ, the equilibrium with
precise announcements is the limit case of the equilibria with imprecise an-
nouncements when θ goes to eθ.
Finally, for a given bias θ, as Proposition 2 indicates, we have the rather
intuitive result that, when the weight ξ increases, the imprecision of the
announcement is reduced.
4 Optimal choice of the central bank
4.1 Results
In this section we assume ξ > 0 (which means that CB announcements are
not cheap talk)19. We consider the choice of the CB between the equilibria
we have considered. We consider the ex ante choice of the CB, when the CB
does not yet know the value of the shock η.
These equilibria are obtained by taking a value of θ belonging to the closed
interval
h
0,eθi , the value θ = eθ corresponding to the equilibrium with precise
announcements. For all the equilibria considered, we have ηan = ηe − θ.
Replacing ηan by ηe− θ in (10) , and noting that we have E(ηe− η) = 0 and
E(ηe − η)2 = σ2η, we get
EUCB = −
µ
ψ
α2 + ψ
+ ξ
¶
σ2η − ξθ2 −
α2 + ψ
ψ
µ2 (20)
The expected utility of the CB is a decreasing function of σ2η and of
θ. Therefore, the CB dislikes both imprecision and bias. The CB dislikes
imprecision for two reasons. First, imprecise announcements lead the PS
to make less eﬃcient decisions. Second, when there is some imprecision in
the announcement, the CB does not tell the whole truth and is therefore
penalized.
The CB dislikes a bias in the announcement because of its credibility
concern (the CB does not tell the truth). And there is no gain for the CB in
having an announcement bias because, at the equilibrium, the PS corrects
19In the cheap talk case ξ = 0, the CB’s choice is trivial because only one equilibrium
remains. For the equilibrium with perfect precision does not exist, and there is only one
partition equilibrium because, from (18) , the bias θ has no eﬀect. This is the equilibrium
found in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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for the bias: the CB cannot manipulate the expectations of the private sector
by introducing an announcement bias.
In the last section, we have seen that there is a trade-oﬀ between impre-
cision and bias. This implies that the CB has to make a choice between the
imprecision and the bias of its announcements. In this section we will con-
sider this choice and determine the optimal amount of bias and imprecision
that the CB would like. The CB chooses θ ∈
h
0,eθi which maximizes EUCB,
where σ2η is the function of θ given by (17) , (18) and (19) .
In order to be able to solve this problem analytically, we will limit our
analysis to the case where the credibility problem of the CB is, in some
sense, small. It will be assumed to be small relatively to the amount of
uncertainty that the PS has on the variable on which the CB has some private
information. More precisely, from (10) , we can see that the CB would like to
have the PS believe that ηe is equal to η− α2+ψψ µ instead of η. This gap
α2+ψ
ψ µ
is at the origin of the credibility problem of the CB. We will assume that the
magnitude of this gap is small when compared to the amount of uncertainty
that the PS has on η. Under our assumption of a uniform distribution for η,
this amount of uncertainty can be represented by the length ηM − ηm of the
support of this distribution. Therefore, we will assume that 1ηM−ηm
α2+ψ
ψ µ is
small. As, from (18) , we have 0 < B ≤ 1ηM−ηm
α2+ψ
ψ µ, this implies that B is
small. Then, we find (see Appendix 2 for a proof):
Proposition 3 Let bθ and cσ2η be the values of θ and σ2η chosen by the CB.
Define ξ ≡ 6µηM−ηm > 0. Then, we have:
- In the case 0 < ξ < ξ, the CB prefers to have imprecise announcements
(we have cσ2η > 0). In this case, the bias bθ is equal to θ = 16 (ηM − ηm) = µξ
(and therefore we have 0 < θ < eθ), and the imprecision cσ2η is a decreasing
function of ξ, satisfying limξ→ξcσ2η = 0.
- In the case ξ ≥ ξ, the CB prefers to have precise announcements (we
have cσ2η = 0). In this case, we have bθ = eθ = µξ . Therefore the bias is a
decreasing function of ξ, and goes to zero when ξ goes to infinity.
In the case 0 < ξ < ξ, the bias eθ = µξ , which would be required to have
the equilibrium with precise announcements, is too high. The CB prefers the
partition equilibrium with the bias θ = µ
ξ
, which is lower than eθ. In this case,
an increase in ξ reduces the imprecision without changing the bias. When ξ
reaches the threshold value ξ , the bias eθ becomes equal to θ, and the CB
prefers the equilibrium with precise announcements. Further increases in ξ
has only the eﬀect of reducing the bias, which is equal to eθ = µξ , because the
12
announcement with perfect precision is always preferred by the CB in this
case.
4.2 Implications
The cheap talk case appears as an extreme case where precise announcements
do not exist. But, as soon as the CB cares about its credibility, precise
announcements can be an equilibrium. However, we have shown that the
CB may nonetheless choose to make imprecise announcements. Thus, our
model is consistent with the fact that, in the real world, we may observe both
imprecise announcements and a credibility concern by the CB.
However, as Proposition 3 also indicates, precise announcements can also
be an equilibrium. It is not necessary to have an infinite weight ξ, and there-
fore to have truthful announcements, in order to have precise announcements.
It is enough that this weight becomes larger than or equal to some threshold
value ξ.
This last result has welfare implications. For, as it is usually the case
in the literature, let us assume that society cares about employment and
inflation, and, for simplicity, consider the case where it weights these two
objectives in the same way as the CB. This means that society’s utility
function Us can be obtained by replacing ξ by zero in the expressions giving
the CB’s utility function. From (20) , we therefore have
EU s = − ψ
α2 + ψ
σ2η −
α2 + ψ
ψ
µ2 (21)
Equality (21) underlines that society only cares about the imprecision of
the announcement. Society does not care about the bias of the announce-
ment because it does not have the credibility concern that the CB has and, as
we have seen, the presence of an announcement bias does not change the be-
havior of the PS because the PS corrects for the bias (we have ηe = ηan+ θ).
Consequently, society always prefers precise anouncements to any equilib-
rium with imprecise announcements. This implies that, as long as the CB
chooses to make imprecise announcements, CB announcements are subopti-
mal. This suboptimality gets smaller when the weight ξ gets larger. Such a
suboptimality completely disappears when the weight ξ becomes larger than
or equal to ξ.
As a consequence, if we are in a situation where we have ξ < ξ, any factor
which increases the weight given by the CB to transmitting its information
in a truthful way, may be beneficial. In fact, it has been argued that the
observed shift of CBs toward more transparency could be explained by the
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previous move of CBs toward more independence. The reason is that this
made it more necessary for the CBs to explain their policies and therefore
to be more transparent. This kind of argument is usually given as the other
main reason for having CB transparency, beside the economic reason. From
this point of view, the present analysis allows us to relate in some way these
two kinds of arguments for transparency: the economic reason and the shift
toward more CB independence. The increased pressure put on an indepen-
dent CB to give its information in a transparent way may be interpreted as an
increase in the weight ξ in our model. Our analysis can therefore be used to
examine the implications of this stronger requirement for transparency, due
to greater CB independence, in a model which takes into account some eco-
nomic consequences of transparency. From our analysis, as we could expect,
this greater concern about being transparent makes the CB more transpar-
ent, in the sense that, from proposition 3, either the bias or the imprecision
of CB announcements decreases when the weight ξ increases. When we start
from a situation where we have ξ < ξ, this increase in the CB’s pressure for
transparency due to the CB’s increased independence is beneficial, because
it takes the form of reduced imprecision. If its eﬀect on ξ is large enough,
it could even completely eliminate the suboptimality of announcements by
leading the CB to make precise announcemnts20.
5 Conclusion
We have considered a model where the CB has some useful private informa-
tion but where a credibility problem may prevent the CB to transmit this
information to the PS. We have assumed that the CB, which is concerned
by its credibility, has to bear some cost when it does not truthfully reveal its
private information. We have shown that this makes precise announcements
of the CB credible, and that this would allow the CB to transmit its private
information to the PS. The required marginal cost of deviating from the an-
nouncement is produced by some announcement bias (a greater bias giving
a greater marginal cost). This implies that precise announcements exhibit
some announcement bias.
However, beside this equilibrium with precise announcements, there are
also equilibria with imprecise announcements. To each level of some an-
20Independent CBs may also exhibit a less acute credibility problem. This eﬀect will
reinforce the eﬀect, going through a larger weight ξ, that we have just considered. For
example, if more independence also implies a smaller value of µ (µ represents the gap be-
tween the CB’s and the PS’s employment targets), then the value of ξ, given in Proposition
3, decreases, which also makes the condition ξ ≥ ξ more easily fulfilled.
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nouncement bias, there corresponds some imprecision of announcements.
The greater the bias is, the more precise the announcements can be. The
reason is that a greater bias implies a greater marginal cost of deviating and,
consequently, more precise announcements become credible. At the limit,
when the bias becomes large enough, precise announcements become possi-
ble.
As a consequence, there is a trade-oﬀ between the imprecision and the
bias of the CB’s announcements. As both the bias and the imprecision are
costly to the CB, this implies that the CB has to make some optimal choice
between the imprecision and the bias of its announcements.
We have studied this optimal choice of the CB. In order to be able to
solve this problem analytically, we have limted the analysis to the case where
the credibility problem of the CB is small, in proportion to the amount
of uncertainty concerning the variable on which the CB has some private
information. We have found that when the weight given to the credibility
concern (which makes untruthful announcements costly) is smaller than some
threshold value, then the CB prefers to make imprecise announcements. And,
the lower this weight is, the more imprecise the annoucements chosen by the
CB is. Although precise announcements can be an equilibrium, the CB
prefers to make imprecise announcements as long as this weight is not too
large. Thus, in this case, we have both imprecise announcements and some
credibility concern of the CB, which are two features which can be observed
in the real world.
On the other hand, when the weight given to the credibility concern is
greater than or equal to this threshold value, precise announcements are pre-
ferred by the CB. This means that it is not necessary to have an infinite
weight, and consequently to constrain the CB to truthfully reveal its infor-
mation, if we want the CB to make precise announcements. What is required
is only that the CB prefers to eliminate all imprecision in its announcements.
From the point of view of society, only the imprecision of the CB’s an-
nouncements matter, because the PS can correct for the bias but cannot
correct for the imprecision of annoucements. Therefore, when the CB prefers
to make imprecise announcemnts, this is suboptimal from the point of view
of society. However this suboptimality disappears when the CB prefers pre-
cise announcements, which occurs when the CB gives a large enough weight
to truthfully revealing its information.
Our analysis also permits us to relate two factors which, in the literature,
were given as separate explanations to the observed shift of CBs toward more
transparency. The first is that the previous shift toward CB independence
required CBs to explain their policies to the public, and, for that, required
them to be more transparent. In our model, this can be interpreted as an
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increase in the weight given to truthfully transmitting the information that
CBs have. The second factor concerns the beneficial economic eﬀects of trans-
parency. This beneficial eﬀect is taken into account in our model because, in
this model, more information allows the PS to make better decisions. Our
analysis underlines that the first factor leads the CB to transmit its use-
ful private information to the PS with more precision, which is beneficial
from the point of view of society. Furthemore, if CB independence increases
the weight given to more truthful announcements by a suﬃcient amount,
this could lead to full transmission of the CB’s information through precise
announcements.
The model we used was a simple static model of monetary policy, in which
a credibility issue arises. This has allowed us to simplify the analysis and
to compare it to other existing studies. However, it would be useful to try
to deal with the same kind of issues in a dynamic model. As we know21, a
dynamic model of monetary policy may lead to credibility issues even in the
absence of a gap between the employment targets of the CB and of the wage
setters (while introducing such a gap was necessary to get a credbility issue
in our static model).
APPENDICES
1. Proof of Proposition 2
For a given θ, the equilibrium condition is that the CB does not (strictly)
prefer to announce that η belongs to an other interval than [ai−1 − θ, ai − θ]
when η belongs to ]ai−1, ai] . And, by continuity, this has to hold also when η
belongs to the closed interval [ai−1, ai]. For a partition (a0, ..., aN), there are
only N discrete possible values for ηan which are given by ηan = aj−1+aj
2
, j =
1, ..., N. Therefore, a partition is an equilibrium if and only if, when η belongs
to [ai−1, ai] , the value ηan =
ai−1+ai
2
is at least as good as any other value
ηan = aj−1+aj
2
, j = 1, ..., N, j 6= i. But, as the function UCB given by (13) is a
concave quadratic function of ηan, this is actually equivalent to having ηan =
ai−1+ai
2
be at least as good as ηan = ai+ai+1
2
and ηan = ai−2+ai−1
2
, which are
the two possible adjacent values for ηan. These two conditions can be written
UCB
¡ai−1+ai
2
¢
− UCB
¡ai+ai+1
2
¢
≥ 0, i = 1, ...N − 1, and UCB
¡ai−1+ai
2
¢
−
UCB
¡ai−2+ai−1
2
¢
≥ 0, i = 2, ..., N, for all η belonging to [ai−1, ai]. Using (13) ,
21See Clarida et al. (1999) in the context of the new Keynesian model which has been
widely used in the literature.
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the first of these two conditions is equivalent to f (i, η) ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., N−1,
and for all η belonging to [ai−1, ai], where we define
f (i, η) ≡
µ
ξ +
ψ
α2 + ψ
¶
(ai+1 + 2ai + ai−1 − 4η) + 4(µ− ξθ) (22)
As f is a decreasing function of η, the inequality f (i, η) ≥ 0 holds for all
η ∈ [ai−1, ai] if and only if we have f (i, ai) ≥ 0. Therefore the first condition
can be written f (i, ai) ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., N − 1.
In the same way, it can easily be seen that the second condition is equiv-
alent to f (i, ai) ≤ 0 for i = 1, ..., N − 1.
Consequently, the equilibrium condition can be written f (i, ai) = 0 for
i = 1, ..., N − 1. Using (22) , this leads to the diﬀerence equation
ai+1 − 2ai + ai = −4 (ηM − ηm)B (23)
where B is given by (18) of proposition 2. If we introduce the "normal-
ized" variables η0 ≡ ηM−ηηM−ηm and a
0
i ≡
ηM−aN−i
ηM−ηm
, then η0 belongs to [0, 1] and
(a00, a
0
1, ...a
0
N) is a partition of [0, 1] where we have a
0
0 = 0, a
0
N = 1 and
a00 < a
0
1 < ... < a
0
N , as in Crawford and Sobel (1982). From (23), the a
0
i
satisfiy the diﬀerence equation a0i+1 − 2a0i + a0i = 4B, i = 1, ..., N − 1. This is
a diﬀerence equation formally identical to the one of the illustrative example
of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (equation 21 p. 1441). However, note that,
from (18) ,in our model, the constant term 4B on the right hand side of this
diﬀerence equation depends on the weight ξ and on the bias θ22.
According to the solutions found in the illustrative example of Crawford
and Sobel (1982), this leads to a finite number of solutions. However, the
equilibrium with the "finest" partition can be selected as the only relevant
partition equilibrium, because this equilibrium partition dominates all the
other partition equilibria (it always gives higher utility levels for both the CB
and the PS). This is the partition which has the greater number of interval
N∗. The value of N∗ is given by (17) (see Crawford and Sobel (1982) p.1441)
Then, using the equality σ2η = (ηM − ηm)
2 σ2η0 and the result for σ
2
η0 found
in Crawford and Sobel (1982) (equation 25 p.1442), we get equation (19) of
Proposition 2.
22In the case ξ = 0, our model is actually formally identical to the one of the il-
lustrative example of Crawford and Sobel (1982). If we take b ≡ −α
2+ψ
ψ
1
ηM−ηm
µ,
V CB ≡ α
2+ψ
ψ
1
(ηM−ηm)2
UCB and V PS ≡
³
α2+ψ
ψ
´2
1
(ηM−ηm)2
UPS , we can write our model
under the form V CB = − (η0e − η0 − b)2 and V PS = − (η0e − η0)2 , which is similar to the
model of the illustrative example of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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Futhermore, Crawford and Sobel (1982) have shown that σ2η0 is an in-
creasing function of B, which goes to zero when B goes to zero. This result,
together with (18) , implies that σ2η is a decreasing function of both θ and ξ,
and that σ2η goes to zero when θ goes to eθ.
2. Proof of Proposition 3
2.1 Proof when we replace hxi by x in (17) .
Consider a partition equilibrium of bias θ ∈
h
0,eθh. The residual variance
σ2η is given by (17) , (18) and (19) . In (17) we will replace hxi , and therefore
the integer N∗, by the real variable x. As Appendix 2.2 below shows, this
can be justified when B is small. From (17) , we have
x ≡ −1
2
+
1
2
µ
1 +
2
B
¶ 1
2
(24)
From (18) and (20), we get
dEUCB
dθ
= 2ξg (θ) (25)
where the function g (.) of θ is given by
g (θ) =
1
2
1
ηM − ηm
dσ2η
dB
− θ (26)
Therefore, from (25) , as we have ξ > 0, the sign (and the nullity) of
dEUCB
dθ is the same as g (θ) .
From (19) , when we replace N∗ by x, we have:
dσ2η
dB
=
1
3
(ηM − ηm)2
∙
−1
2
x0(B)
x(B)3
+ 2B2x(B)x0(B) + 2B
¡
x(B)2 − 1
¢¸
(27)
where x(B) is the function given by (24) . Therefore, from (24) , the derivative
x0(B) is
x0(B) = −1
2
B−2
µ
1 +
2
B
¶− 1
2
(28)
From (17) and (28) , when B is small, we have the equivalences:
x(B) v (2B)−
1
2 x0(B) v − (2B)−
3
2 (29)
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From (29), we obtain limB→0
³
−1
2
x0(B)
x(B)3
´
= 1
2
;
limB→0 (2B2x(B)x0(B)) = −12 ; and limB→0 (2B (x(B)2 − 1)) = 1. Using
(27) , these equalities imply limB→0
dσ2η
dB =
1
3
(ηM − ηm)2 . Consequently, from
(26) , g(θ) and therefore also dEU
CB
dθ have the sign of
1
6
(ηM − ηm)− θ when B
is small.
Consequently, in the case 1
6
(ηM − ηm) < eθ, which is eqivalent to having
ξ < ξ ≡ 1ηM−ηm6µ, there is an interior solution
bθ = 1
6
(ηM − ηm) = µξ . This
is the equilibrium with imprecise announcements which corresponds to the
partition equilibrium obtained for the optimal bias bθ = 1
6
(ηM − ηm). In
this case, as long as we have ξ < ξ, when ξ increases, the bias remains
equal to 1
6
(ηM − ηm) . Therefore, from Proposition 2, when ξ increases, the
imprecision σ2η decreases, and goes to zero when ξ goes to ξ. In the case ξ ≥ ξ
, or equivalently 1
6
(ηM − ηm) ≥ eθ, we have dEUCBdθ > 0 for all θ ∈ h0,eθh , and
we have dEU
CB
dθ ≥ 0 for θ = eθ. We therefore get the corner solution bθ = eθ,
which corresponds to precise announcements. This gives Proposition 3.
2.2 Justification to replacing hxi by x in (17)
In the above proof, the function hxi has been replaced by x, where x,
given by (24) , is the term inside h.i in (17) .We will now argue that, when B
is small, this can be justified. As, from (18) , there is a one to one relation-
ship between θ and B, the optimization problem of the CB can be seen as
finding the value of B which maximizes EUCB. Then, consider the problem
of maximizing EUCB where B, instead of being a continuous variable, is a
discrete variable obtained by only taking the values of B which, according to
(24) , give integer values of x. Then, for this optimization problem, where B
takes these discrete values, having hxi instead of x would make no diﬀerence.
Therefore, any error due to the substitution of x to hxi would be negligible
if we can show that the diﬀerence between taking this discrete B variable
instead of the continuous B variable would itself be negligible. This would
be the case if the lengths of the intervals between two adjacent values of the
corresponding discrete B variable are negligible.
Consider such an interval [hxi , hx+ 1i] . By definition, the length of such
an interval is equal to
R hx+1i
hxi
¯¯
dB
dx
¯¯
dx. This would be negligible if
¯¯
dB
dx
¯¯
is neg-
ligible. But dBdx is equal to
1
x0(B) , and, according to (29) , we have x
0 (B) v
− (2B)−
3
2 . This implies
¯¯
dB
dx
¯¯
∼ (2B)
3
2 . When B is small, this is negligible
relatively to B. Therefore, by having replaced hxi by x in the proof, any
error we could have made on the optimal announcement chosen by the CB,
would be negligible.
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